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USDAO SAIGON MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
AND THREAT ANALYSIS FOR JANUARY 1975

This Month's Intelligence Summary and Threat Analysis contains the following subjects:

- a. Ceasefire Perspective
- b. North Vietnam's Strategy
- c. Air Defense
- d. Logistics
- e. Infiltration
- f. Strategic Reserve
- g. Activity by Military Region
- h. Conclusion

The two years following the Ceasefire Agreement of January 1973 have witnessed the most dramatic increase in Communist military strength in South Vietnam since the war began. Communist strategists, from the beginning, emphasized that the agreement represented to them merely a legalistic framework in which they could rationalize the domination of the South. The initial eighteen months was a period in which Communist forces emphasized consolidation and expansion of rear areas through the uninterrupted flow of men and arms to the South. The following overview attempts to place in perspective the developments of the past two years and assess what they portend for the future.

Concerning aid to North Vietnam, preliminary analysis indicates that North Vietnam received a record volume of economic assistance goods from its allies in 1974, amounting to an increase of more than 27% over the record tonnage imported in 1973.

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EO 12356, Sec 3.4

MR 89-7-1 DIA 12/26/89

By 634 NARA Date 2/6/90

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1974

Food	1,409,800
POL	762,700
Fertilizer	225,000
General*	1,437,500

1973

Food	903,900
POL	617,800
Fertilizer	194,200
General*	1,073,600



TOTAL 3,835,000(Metric Tons) 2,789,500(Metric Tons)

*Includes construction materiel and equipment, machinery, chemicals, medicines, spare parts, vehicles, textiles, paper products, cement, lumber, steel, consumer goods.

The most spectacular increase occurred in food imports, which soared to alleviate serious shortfalls in domestic production. There was also a substantial increase in the importation of goods in the general category, which includes those commodities Hanoi needs to pursue reconstruction and development plans.

The People's Republic of China supplied 51% of the tonnage imported in 1974, a decrease of about 9% compared to its 1973 effort, while the Soviet Union increased its 1974 contribution by 8%.

1974

People's Republic of China	51.2
Soviet Union	36.1
East Europe	4.6
Other Communist Nations	6.3
Free World Nations	1.8

1973


People's Republic of China	60.3
Soviet Union	28.1
East Europe	5.3
Other Communist Nations	4.2
Free World Nations	2.1

In short, Hanoi's allies have been most generous in their economic assistance during the post-ceasefire period.

In regard to military aid, the Defense Intelligence

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Agency has provided a preliminary estimate of the amount of military equipment supplied to North Vietnam during 1974. This estimate will undoubtedly be revised upward as more data are obtained. It should be emphasized that, in contrast to intelligence on economic aid, sources of information on military aid are limited and fragmentary at best.



People's Republic of China

Soviet Union

<u>Air/Air Defense</u>	<u>Units</u>
Jet Aircraft	
MIG-19	29
L-29	2

<u>Air/Air Defense</u>	<u>Units</u>
SA-7 Missiles	100
MI-8 Helicopters	9

<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Units</u>
Field Artillery	
130MM	30
122MM	10
Armor	
T-59	15
APC's	50

<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Units</u>
Field Artillery	
130MM	30
122MM	15
Armor	
T-54	15

Infantry Weapons*

Infantry Weapons*

Ammunition (Short Tons)
25,000

Ammunition (Short Tons)
12,000

<u>Other</u>	<u>Units</u>
Trucks	600

<u>Other</u>	<u>Units</u>
Trucks	400
Artillery Prime Movers	75

*Variety precludes detailed listing.

The most discernible trend in military imports during 1974 was the sharp decrease in detected deliveries of air defense equipment. In past years, air defense equipment comprised at least one-third of the total value. This reduced

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emphasis on air defense equipment is a natural development, considering the cessation of the air war over North Vietnam. Present emphasis is on ground forces equipment and ammunition.

For the first time since 1970, China appears to be the primary contributor of military aid, supplying about \$170 million in comparison to \$85 million from the Soviet Union:


People's Republic of China	\$170 million
Soviet Union	\$85 million
Sub-total	\$255 million
East Europe	\$5 million
Total	\$260 million

The preliminary minimum estimate of \$260 million for military aid to Hanoi in 1974 covers only the estimated cost of the equipment, excluding such expensive ancillary costs as these:

- a. Transportation.
- b. Spare parts.
- c. Equipment maintenance.
- d. Economic aid/resources consumed by the military.
- e. Advisors and support.
- f. Training.

In summation, although the amount and value of military aid supplied to Hanoi since the ceasefire may have decreased, North Vietnam has received sufficient military supplies to significantly upgrade its military capabilities in South Vietnam. This fact is dramatically underscored by the estimated 66,000 tons of ammunition moved into and stockpiled in South Vietnam since the ceasefire, over and above significant expenditures.

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In North Vietnam, the Communists rebuilt their strategic reserve, which can now be deployed to South Vietnam in record time:

Divisions	Deployment Estimated Strengths*	Location	Deployment Time (Days)		
			MR-1	MR-2	MR-3
308th	8,500	Hanoi Area	10	16	27
308B	8,500	Northwest of Hanoi	10	16	27
312th	8,500	Thanh Hoa	9	15	26
316th	8,500	Nghe An	9	15	26
320B	8,500	Thanh Hoa	9	15	26
338th	8,500	Thanh Hoa	9	15	26
341st	8,500	Quang Binh	2	15	26
Total	59,500				

*Table of Organization and Equipment Strength: 10,000 per division.

This reserve force backs up their large commitment to South Vietnam of both men and weapons:

	January 1973	January 1975	Net Change
Combat Personnel	130-156,000	187-212,000	+57,000
Admin Personnel	64-78,000	91-107,000	+29,000
Total Personnel	194-234,000	278-319,000	+84,000
Divisions	16 (+ one Air Defense)	17 (+ three Air Defense)	+ 1 (+ two Air Defense)
Regiments	79 (+ twelve Air Defense)	94 (+ twenty-six Air Defense)	+ 15 (+ four-teen Air Defense)
Armor Vehicles	90-115	665-750	+ 610
Artillery Pieces	85-105	350-490	+ 325

Added to these forces are an estimated guerrilla strength of 24-34,000.

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Hanoi has rebuilt and supported its southern forces through heavy infiltration:

1968	235,000
1969	106,000
1970	54,000
1971	66,000
1972	152,000
1973	74,000
1974	95,000
1975	38,000

Total since ceasefire 194,000 (February 1973 to present).

These infiltrators are now capable of moving south faster than ever before:

<u>Area</u>	<u>Pre-ceasefire (On Foot)</u>	<u>Post Ceasefire (By Truck)</u>
Demilitarized Zone	20 Days	5 Days
Military Region Tri-Thien	35 Days	8 Days
Military Region 5	60 Days	15 Days
B-3 Front	60 Days	15 Days
Central Office for South Vietnam	90 Days	21 Days

In addition, the Communists have built or developed over 1,500 miles of roads in and near South Vietnam. They have also constructed large base complexes as well as a major port at Dong Ha. The port of Dong Ha has been expanded to handle up to 1,100 short tons of materiel per day. Shipments of all types of materiel during 1973 and 1974 reflect the growing importance of Dong Ha:

	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974 (11 months)</u>
Overland	99,800	110,000
Dong Ha	49,500	137,500
Total (Short Tons)	149,300	247,500

In addition, the Communists have expanded their POL pipeline and it now extends from Communist China to Military Region 3.

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In order to defend their "new" rear areas, the Communists deployed some seventeen Air Defense Regiments including the 263rd SAM Regiment currently located at Khe Sanh. Their current Air Defense order of battle in South Vietnam has restricted or prohibited Vietnamese Air Force operations over large areas:

	<u>Military Region 1</u>	<u>Military Region 2</u>	<u>Military Region 3</u>	<u>Military Region 4</u>	<u>Total</u>
Divisions	2	0	1	0	3
Regiments	19*	4	3	0	26
Guns**	1,360	240	200	0	1,800
Personnel	23,400	3,600	6,500	0	33,500

*Includes 263rd SAM Regiment with 20-30 SA-2 launchers.

**Guns range in size from 12.7MM to 100MM.

In addition to building up their forces in South Vietnam, the Communists reorganized their units, reflecting a fundamental emphasis on creation of a conventional army with increasingly sophisticated lines of command and control.

A 1st Corps Headquarters, exercising control over four divisions, has been established in Thanh Hoa area of North Vietnam (308th, 312th, 320B, and 338th Infantry Divisions).

In South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese Army 2nd Corps (325th and 324B Infantry Divisions) has emerged in Military Region 1, while a 301st Corps (7th, 9th, and possibly 3rd Infantry Divisions) has been created in the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Area.

At a lower level, a number of artillery, armor and sapper units, which previously operated more or less independently, have been subordinated directly to divisional control, improving the command and control mechanisms for combined arms combat.

Finally, a number of new regimental and divisional level infantry units have been created largely by the merging of existing units into unified higher level commands.

With the increase in military might and a shift in

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strategy towards a military solution in 1974, the Communists increased combat operations and captured an entire province (Phuoc Long) for the first time in the history of the war.

This increase in fighting is a result of a marked change in Communist strategy. During the immediate post-ceasefire period Communist strategy was reflected more prominently in COSVN Resolution 02-73, issued at the time of the agreement. This resolution announced the commencement of the political struggle era and relegated military forces to a secondary support role.

At that time, Communist planners apparently believed that much could be gained through intensified political pressure on the Government of South Vietnam, supported by selective small-scale military operations. It was also recognized that the reduction in hostilities afforded them opportunities to enlarge and strengthen their rear areas, free of strategic air interdiction or major allied pre-emptive operations.

COSVN briefings between June and August 1973 indicated that an important first phase in the above plans, that of assuring protection of their base areas, was complete. The next phase was to emphasize organization of all Communist forces in the south into a modern conventional army, supported by armor, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry.

Beginning in late September 1973, a series of COSVN briefings on a COSVN Resolution 4 revealed plans for a "strategic raids" campaign for 1974. This concept envisioned a somewhat heightened level of hostilities, but short of a level that would provoke major international repercussions. Its objectives were to:

- a. Expand territory.
- b. Increase population in Communist-controlled areas.
- c. Gain a political victory by forcing the Government of Vietnam to establish a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, leading ultimately to

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a new government favorable to the Communists.

In August 1974, however, the Communists adopted a strategy envisioning a large-scale offensive to defeat the Government of South Vietnam pacification and bring about new negotiations. It called for an intense military campaign beginning in December 1974 and lasting until mid-1975. In defeating pacification, the Communist forces were to fulfill certain requirements (kill one-third of the Government of Vietnam's Main Forces, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces; neutralize one-half of the People's Self Defense Forces; and cut key Lines of Communication) in order to accomplish certain missions: liberate the bulk of the countryside; increase the population in the Communist areas; obtain rice; and upgrade contested areas.

The 1974-75 Dry Season Campaign began dramatically in December with major attacks throughout Military Region 3 and Military Region 4, with the most visible result being the Government of Vietnam's loss of Phuoc Long Province. Major combat has since declined in those areas, but is expected to resume. In Military Region 1 and Military Region 2, the bulk of available intelligence indicates that major combat will soon be forthcoming. The campaign, thus, is expected to assume countrywide proportions and a number of indicators points to the introduction of strategic reserve divisions from North Vietnam.

Thus, Communist strategy since the ceasefire has evolved from a rather cautious approach in the early stages, involving testing of the Paris Agreement and building up of rear areas, to one based primarily on battlefield victories to exploit the perceived weaknesses of the Government of Vietnam. The COSVN Resolution for 1975 heralds a return to major offensive activity as the primary means of advancing the Communist revolution to a successful conclusion.

A press report from Hanoi indicates that a 23rd Plenum of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee was held recently. Based on historical precedents, major new policy guidance is expected to emerge from this plenum. Although the subject matter of the plenum resolution is unknown, the lack of public discussion suggests that it may concern sensitive

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policies relating to the South.

In North Vietnam, there are several developments that could portend a significant escalation in combat. During the past thirty days, North Vietnam has upgraded its ability to engage in air operations in the North Vietnamese Panhandle and over South Vietnam. By 23 January, at least thirty-four MIG-17 aircraft, possibly from the 923rd Fighter Regiment, had deployed from Kien An Airfield to Bai Thuong. The aircraft had apparently engaged in extensive ground support training prior to their deployment. These aircraft are capable of conducting air operations over Military Region 1 as far south as Danang.

Use of aircraft by North Vietnamese Forces in Military Region 1 could offer major advantages:

- a. "Shock effect" on Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
- b. Ground support of North Vietnamese Army.
- c. Suppression of Vietnamese Air Force.

In order to defend the MIG-17's against the Vietnamese Air Force, North Vietnam would probably use MIG-21 aircraft as air cover. While no permanent deployments of MIG-21's to the southern Panhandle have been noted, the recent return of MIG-21's to Phuc Yen from Kep may be to prepare a contingent of these craft for deployment to the south. Additionally North Vietnam's improvement of major southern airfields such as Dong Hoi and Vinh as well as alternate fields at Ben Loi, Quang Lang and Quang Te provides North Vietnam with suitable bases for MIG operations.

Current disposition of North Vietnam's MIG aircraft is:

<u>Airfield</u>	<u>MIG-15/17</u>	<u>MIG-19</u>	<u>MIG-21</u>
Yen Bai	17	88	
Kep	36		9
Phuc Yen	25	1	55
Dong Suong			7
Kien An	1		
Bai Thuong	34		
Total	113	89	71

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The magnitude of the anticipated North Vietnamese logistics effort and the ultimate destination of the supplies to be moved are unknown. Supplies, however could easily be shipped to the B-3 Front and COSVN. The South Laos Dual-lane Road as well as Route 14 south of the Tri-Border area are in good condition and are supporting a moderate to heavy flow of truck traffic. Photography taken on 24 January revealed one hundred and fifty-five trucks heading south on the South Laos Dual-lane Road. Photography taken on 25 January revealed one hundred and fifty trucks heading west along Route 9 near Khe Sanh. Both convoys could have reached the Tri-Border area by 29 January. These convoys represent typical examples of traffic noted this season.

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
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In infiltration activity, during January, the North Vietnamese Army accelerated its 1974-1975 dry season effort and dispatched as many as 42 combat replacement groups, concentrating primarily on COSVN and secondarily on the B-3 Front. Including gap-fills, 33 groups were dispatched to COSVN and seven to the B-3 Front. Already, the number of troops arriving in COSVN during January and February 1975 surpasses any previous January-February arrivals:

YEAR	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	TOTAL
1968	2,200	3,600	5,800
1969	2,500	2,300	4,800
1970	400	5,100	5,500
1971	0	11,500	11,500
1972	0	1,400	1,400
1973	0	3,200	3,200
1974	4,500	12,400	16,900
1975	4,100	18,000	22,100

To date in 1975, 38,100 infiltrators have arrived in South Vietnam:

AREA	TOTAL
2nd Corps	---
MRTT	3,100
MR-5	1,600
B-3 Front	6,200
COSVN	27,200
TOTAL	38,100




If the enemy's current effort continues throughout the dry season, over 100,000 troops will arrive in the south by May.

	1975	1972	1968
November	2,200	0	7,100
December	3,600	5,300	3,300
January	8,300	8,600	24,400
February	21,600	14,400	14,000
March	21,600	18,900	33,300
April	21,600	20,100	25,800
May	21,600	16,300	30,200
	100,000 plus	83,000 plus	138,000 plus

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There are indications that Hanoi may deploy one or more of its strategic reserve divisions to South Vietnam. Anomalies within the current posture of the 312th Division indicate that it could be on its way to COSVN. Additionally, changes in the status of the 316th and 341st Divisions could also indicate that they are on their way to South Vietnam.

Agents have also reported the deployment of the 308th Division to Quang Tri Province in December 1974 and alleged that the division will participate in attacks during the period around Tet.

Enemy logistical efforts, infiltration, MIG deployments, the current posture of the strategic reserve and a number of ominous indicators that have emerged in South Vietnam over the past few weeks suggest a major intensification of combat activity is in the offing. Some of these indicators remain to be confirmed. The most alarming intelligence concerns the possible moves of elements of the North Vietnamese strategic reserve to Military Regions 1 and 3, but there is considerable uncertainty regarding their validity. Also in the realm of uncertainty are the implications of the recent 23rd Plenum of the North Vietnam Lao Dong Party Central Committee regarding possible future Communist policy toward the South. Within this context, we will now review in detail the possible implications of current indicators within each Military Region.


In Military Region 1 during the past month, there have been numerous indicators of a change in the Communist force structure. Upgrading of units, rotation of forces and plans and preparation for attacks have been reported throughout the Military Region.

The former 45th and 164th Artillery and 202nd Armor Regiments have been recently upgraded to brigades and have apparently been functioning as such for about four or five months. A brigade structure can provide better command and control of a larger number of subordinate forces operating in diversified areas.

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As previously mentioned, tenuous information suggests that the North Vietnamese Army 341st Division could be deploying to Military Region 1. Due to the close proximity of the division to Military Region 1 and the fact that the majority of its subordinates have historically operated in Quang Tri Province, we believe that the unit could enter northern Military Region 1 undetected.

On 11 and 12 January, elements of the 101st Regiment/325th Division in Quang Tri Province were noted turning over weapons and ammunition to unidentified units. Activity of this nature has been noted in the past, as units rotate from front line positions; however, given the unknown status of the 341st Division, the 325th could be in the process of being replaced by the 341st.

Five agents have reported the following concerning the 308th Division:

- a. 308th Division is in Quang Tri Province preparing for attacks during February.
- b. Battalion of 88th Regiment was located south southwest of Cam Lo District town (16 January).
- c. Element of 102nd Regiment deploying to Rao Vinh Mountains south southeast of Cam Lo District town (14 January).
- d. 58th Artillery Regiment was located southwest of Dong Ha. (20 December).
- e. 36th Regiment moved west southwest of Dong Ha (13 January).

On 20 January 1975, one agent report indicated the possible introduction of North Vietnamese Army 316th Division into Thua Thien Province. Attacks were to be launched in February with the main objective being Hue City. Two Communist infantry divisions with AAA, artillery and armor support were to be involved in the attacks. The missions of 316th Division are reported to be to attack Phu Loc District, block the Hai Van Pass and interdict QL-1.

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In Quang Ngai Province, Army of the Republic of Vietnam all-source information indicates the possible upgrading of the 52nd Brigade to a division by adding two regiments and numerous battalions. This information possibly correlates with recent indications that a new division is to operate in the Province and coordinate pending large-scale Communist attacks.

Each of these developments, taken separately, indicates little beyond heightened activity. However, by combining all information into a scenario of what could possibly happen, the signs are ominous.

In Quang Tri Province, the upgrading of the three support regiments to brigades indicates the ability to handle larger numbers of troops and weapons and to provide increased support for North Vietnamese Army infantry forces.

If the Communists commit three divisions to northern Military Region 1, the threat to Hue could very well become overwhelming. Another possibility is that a strong show of force by two or three divisions attacking Hue and Danang could force Army of Republic of Vietnam defenders to abandon Hue in order to consolidate defensive positions around Danang. Military Region 1 Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Truong, said, if serious threats were made on Danang, Hue would almost certainly fall, since the marines would be needed for the defense of Danang.

There are also tenuous indications that the 316th Division and/or 308th Division could deploy to Quang Nam Province to attempt to take Danang City. By controlling the Hai Van Pass, the North Vietnamese Army could block attempts to reinforce from the North. Front 4 forces reportedly have the mission of attacking Army of Republic of Vietnam in Duy Xuyen District in a possible attempt to interdict QL-1, thereby thwarting attempts to reinforce Danang from the south.

The reinforcement and upgrading of the 52nd Brigade in Quang Ngai Province could well give Communist forces the strength necessary to carry out Military Region 5 guidance to gain control of the entire Province. The likelihood of this coming to fruition would be greatly enhanced if serious attacks were mounted in the north.

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Although this is perhaps a "worst case" scenario, the indicators, though tenuous, are there. If three new Communist Divisions are introduced into Military Region 1 and combined attacks are launched, it is probable that Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, unless heavily reinforced, will lose most of northern Military Region 1 and possibly the city of Hue. If the attacks are pressed towards Danang, the Government of Vietnam could be facing its most serious crisis in the history of the war.

In Military Region 2, there have been several indications during the past month that the North Vietnamese Army significantly augmented and upgraded its forces and is planning and preparing for major attacks.

Recent intelligence confirms the move of the Headquarters, 968th Division to Duc Co area of Pleiku Province from South Laos. The composition, capabilities and intentions of the division are unclear. It is believed, however, that the division moved in-country with its 19th and 39th Regiments and at least two battalions of the formerly-independent 29th Regiment. The 968th has not been engaged in combat for over two years and is not believed to be prepared for major combat operations at this time. The move of the Division Headquarters to Duc Co seemed to indicate that Pleiku City would be the primary target for Communist attacks in the highlands; however, the 19th and 39th Regiments are currently unlocated, while the Headquarters, 29th Regiment is located northwest of Kontum City.

In Binh Dinh Province, recent information has confirmed the creation of a new 68th Artillery Regiment subordinate to the 3rd North Vietnamese Army Division. This unit was reportedly formed from an artillery battalion and an anti-aircraft battalion from the 3rd Division, a formerly independent AA Battalion, augmented by two batteries of 130MM field guns. Integration of 130MM guns significantly enhances the 3rd Division's artillery capability. Upgrading and consolidation of artillery units under division command follows a similar trend observed in other North Vietnamese Army Divisions.

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Recent prisoners of war from 3rd Division Headquarters support elements report that, since 1 January, the division has engaged in detailed reconnaissance of the QL-19 area in preparation for attacks. Sources indicate possibly two regiments with heavy artillery support will attempt to interdict the highway and bring Phu Cat Air Base under effective fire. Although the timing of this effort is unknown, sources reported major attacks would occur by March.

Additionally, there have been other indications of possible Communist unit moves. Recent prisoners of war reported that the 52nd Brigade had conducted a reconnaissance of northern Binh Dinh Province in preparations for a move from Quang Ngai to free 3rd Division elements for their move south. There are indications that elements of the 52nd Brigade had actually moved to Northern Binh Dinh, but were recalled to Quang Ngai to counter the current Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces operations in Nghia Hanh District.

There are also some indications of a change in the status of the 320th Division in Pleiku Province. On 5 February, a rallier from the 48th Regiment reported that the entire division moved during late January to the Pleiku/Darlac Province border area in order to conduct attacks against Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces positions near QL-14.


Despite the lack of clarity concerning the status and intentions of Communist forces, all of these recent developments convey a threatening picture. Taking a worst-case scenario, properly coordinated major attacks by all four North Vietnamese Army Divisions, possibly augmented by elements of a brigade from Military Region 1, would very seriously strain Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces ability to react.

An optimum strategy for the North Vietnamese Army might include attacks against Government of Vietnam positions around Kontum and Pleiku cities in sufficient force to fix major Republic of Vietnam Air Force units, while interdicting principal LOC's to prevent resupply and reinforcement.

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Communist success in holding key Lines of Communications against a certain Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces commitment of major forces to reopen them could preclude the need to press the attack against the province capitals in the current campaign. Effective isolation of Kontum City and Northern Binh Dinh, for instance, could force the Government of Vietnam to abandon these areas or at least seriously erode Republic of Vietnam Armed Force's ability to defend them in the long term.

Less than adequate coordination in the timing of Communist attacks against all strategic targets should allow Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to conduct an effective defense, although they would be hard-pressed. The Corps Commander, Major General Phu, has stated that his principal concerns are keeping major Lines of Communications open, especially QL-19 and QL-21, and defending province capitals, principally Kontum City.

The 23rd Division Commander, Brigadier General Tuong, has indicated that, if the 320th Division attacks Pleiku City without being reinforced, the attacks could be easily contained.

If the 320th and 968th Divisions make coordinated attacks against the city, they also could be contained, provided all three regiments of the 23rd Division are available for defense of the city and one Ranger Group provides security for QL-19 to the East.

The Ranger Commander, Colonel Tat, has stated his confidence in being able to hold Kontum City with available forces which include four Ranger Groups and one Regional Force Group, so long as North Vietnamese Army strength does not increase to two full divisions. A two-division coordinated attack, which the Corps Commander discounts, would require one additional Ranger Group.

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The 22nd Division Commander, Brigadier General Niem, is also confident of his ability to hold Lines of Communications and most populated areas in Binh Dinh Province. Failure of the 52nd Brigade to reinforce the 3rd North Vietnamese Army Division adequately in Northern Binh Dinh may allow Army of the Republic of Vietnam to defend QL-19 and Phu Cat Air Base with two or three regiments and one Regional Force Group, while one or two regiments and one Regional Force Group defend the northern districts. Army of the Republic of Vietnam reinforcement by a Ranger Group will almost certainly be precluded by any scenario in the central highlands. The likelihood of effective North Vietnamese Army attacks in Binh Dinh is diminished by the series of tactical setbacks suffered by the 3rd Division since August 1974 and by current indications that the 52nd Brigade may continue to be tied down by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in Quang Ngai Province.

Therefore, if the Communists piecemeal their attacks, the situation in Military Region 2 should remain stable. On the other hand, effectively coordinated combined arms attacks could possibly result in the loss of at least one Province capital in the central highlands.

The COSVN Resolution for 1975 indicated that activity in Government of Vietnam Military Region 3 would be very intense. The overrunning of Phuoc Long Province in early January demonstrated the expanded scope of Communist initiatives and provided a precursor of future events. This COSVN Resolution also identified Tay Ninh as a key battlefield in the coming year.

Another indicator of expanded activity for 1975 is infiltration. Already, over 22,000 troops, nearly double last year's total at this time, have arrived or are enroute. Reported Communist losses for the past two months, however, total over 10,000 KIA, the majority of which occurred in Government of Vietnam Military Region 4. Communist casualties will continue to be high in the coming months, if they launch large-scale attacks in Military Regions 3 and 4, as expected.

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If infiltration continues at the current rate, past and projected losses should be replaced, thus allowing the Communists to pursue any military option desired.

The most threatening future event would be the previously mentioned deployment of the 312th or any other of the North Vietnamese Reserve Divisions to Government of Vietnam Military Region 1.

Even without the arrival of a new division to Military Region 3, significant activity is expected. Tay Ninh will probably remain a key area, as will the semi-isolated areas in Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces.

In Tay Ninh, the major goal is reportedly to either overrun or effectively isolate Tay Ninh city. A force structure equivalent to 8 to 10 regiments could be committed. The 3rd North Vietnamese Army Division, over 5,000 strong, is deploying from Phuoc Long to Tay Ninh, with some elements already in the Province. Meanwhile, the 205th Regiment has moved southward to the Parrot's Beak. The 101st Regiment remains southeast of Tay Ninh city in position to hit key Lines of Communications leading into the city. The 9th North Vietnamese Army Division generally remains in western Binh Duong Province, although reconnaissance forces have been reported in Northern Hau Nghia. Our current estimate is that the 3rd Division will attack Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces positions north of Tay Ninh city, the 9th Division will attack into southeastern Tay Ninh/northern Hau Nghia and other units will support with attacks southwest and southeast of the city. Heavy indirect fire support, and possibly armor, could be expected.

The 7th North Vietnamese Army Division probably will either attack Phu Giao and Chon Thanh District towns or expand its area of operations west of QL-13 in support of 9th North Vietnamese Army Division efforts in Tay Ninh Province.

The Military Region 7 Division probably will increase pressure on Xuan Loc District town and/or increase attacks against QL-1 and QL-20 in Long Khanh Province.

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Our present estimate is that the Communists will probably continue the strategy started in Phuoc Long and concentrate on eliminating isolated or semi-isolated positions such as Chon Thanh, Tri Tam and possibly Phu Giao. Meanwhile, attacks to contract the Government of Vietnam's position around Tay Ninh City and attacks by fire against the city will continue. Rocket and sapper attacks against key LOC's and installations in the Saigon/Bien Hoa area will increase.

Without the introduction of an additional Communist division to Military Region 3, the Government of Vietnam will probably be able to limit any Communist gains into the more populated areas. The Government of Vietnam's defense burden will be great, especially since it still has the albatrosses of An Loc and Chon Thanh, which draw away some 9 infantry battalions and require costly support.

The introduction of another Communist division to Military Region 3 could be decisive. This new division could attack with the 3rd Division from the north towards Tay Ninh City in conjunction with 9th Division attacks into southeast Tay Ninh and northern Hau Nghia. The 9th Division attacks would be designed to interdict land transport into Tay Ninh, the 7th Division would attempt to keep the 5th Army of Republic of Vietnam division committed in central Binh Duong, and the Military Region 7 Division would attempt to prevent the deployment of the 18th Division to more critical battlefields in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia.

The Communists' chances of gaining control of Tay Ninh Province would be directly related to their ability to prevent Army of Republic of Vietnam from reinforcing and resupplying the Tay Ninh area. For the Government of Vietnam, keeping a land route to Tay Ninh open would be critical. Communist artillery would close the airfield and the rapid deployment of SA-7 and other AA units to the forward areas of the battlefield would limit Vietnamese Air Force's ability to operate effectively there. The criticality of the situation

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in Military Region 4 would probably preclude the redeployment of reserve units from there. Therefore, the newly formed Airborne, Marine or Ranger strategic reserve units would probably be called upon to at least relieve the 18th Army Republic of Vietnam Division units for movement to Tay Ninh. Additionally, the ability of the Government of Vietnam to neutralize Communist indirect fire will be important, because, although the Government of Vietnam may successfully defend Tay Ninh city, the Communists may level the place. With the arrival of an additional division to Military Region 3, the Government of Vietnam would be severely tested and, depending on the coordination of Communist elements and the subsequent Government of Vietnam reaction, Tay Ninh Province could be lost.

In Military Region 4, current information suggests that the Communists intend to apply hard pressure during February and may conduct attacks against urban areas and key LOC's.

In the upper Delta, the 5th North Vietnamese Army Division will continue trying to carve out a secure zone inside northern Kien Tuong Province. This will, in all probability, be supported with a wave of harassment and attacks by fire in Dinh Tuong, with possible efforts by the 8th North Vietnamese Division to strike in Tri Phap or along Route 4.

Presently, the 5th Division is believed to be preparing for attacks against Moc Hoa and preliminary information suggests it may be reinforced by armored personnel carriers. With reinforcements, the 5th Division could be successful in taking Moc Hoa.

Overall, Communist prospects in the upper Delta for the coming month are not very favorable, but the Communists will keep Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces fully occupied.

In the lower Delta, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army goals seem more ambitious, encompassing widespread attacks against some or all of the following targets:

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- a. Vi Thanh City, Chuong Thien Province
- b. Bac Lieu City, Bac Lieu Province
- c. QL-4 corridor between Ba Xuyen and An Xuyen Provinces
- d. Kien Binh District town, Kien Giang Province
- e. Hai Yen and Song Ong Doc District towns, An Xuyen Province
- f. Phuoc Long District town, Bac Lieu Province
- g. Hoa Tu District town, Ba Xuyen Province
- h. Long Toan District town, Vinh Binh Province

Communist forces capable of attacking these targets are equal to, or in some cases, stronger than the defenders. The threat to all would be amplified by simultaneous attacks which would impair Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces reinforcement and resupply capabilities.

Several factors tend to increase the prospects of expanded Communist holdings by the end of the month:

- a. increased Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army freedom of movement.
- b. reactionary posture of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
- c. greater proximity to key targets
- d. security within Communist staging areas
- e. increased Communist firepower

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While the Communists can expect stiffened Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces resistance and subsequent higher costs in attempting to carry out initiatives against probable targets, they need not, in fact, actually seize these objectives to achieve near term ends. Vinh Binh Province offers a case in point. Though still in possession of all but one district town, the Government of Vietnam has yielded significant areas of control to the Communists. Influence over the populace is waning, with 19,000 known refugees and uncounted numbers of villagers now exposed to direct Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army presence. Thus, the Communists have, in fact, gained control over most of the three southern districts of Vinh Binh Province. Areas of other Provinces have also been softened by months of Communist pressure and appear ripe for additional exploitation.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, realizing the precarious status of some district towns and the considerable Communist threat confronting them, have taken measures to beef up defenses and consolidate ineffectual and understrength territorials into larger, more formidable elements.

For the first time since the ceasefire, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are reacting on a coordinated and imaginative basis in anticipation of upcoming attacks. For example, one year ago the D-2 Regiment wiped out the better part of two battalions from the 21st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division in a brief ambush. During the end of the past December highpoint, the D-2 Regiment may have taken as many as 600 casualties in prolonged engagements with the 21st. 21st Division sources estimate that the average battalion strength of the D-2 may have dropped by 50 percent to around 125 men. This action and later operations to push the 13B Regiment out of staging areas north of Vi Thanh City may have already alleviated potential Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army pressure.

The Communists will continue to make gains in the rural areas. The chances for success in the reported planned attacks on Bac Lieu City are low, especially since the element of

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surprise has been lost and Communist capabilities are not sufficient. That the Communists even considered such an operation, however, illustrates the Communists' perception of their own capabilities vis-a-vis Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

If reported plans are executed, the Communists will be crossing the threshold between the outpost war and an attempt to deal critical blows to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and the Government of Vietnam. In the near term, the Communists will probably experience continued success, to include overrunning of some district towns; however, increased Communist losses may prove prohibitive in the long run.

In conclusion, despite the lack of clarity concerning a number of key indicators as regards both specific intent and timing, we anticipate a significant upsurge in combat in Northern South Vietnam, as poor weather gradually abates in late February and March, and a resumption of major attacks in Military Region 3, once Communist preparations are complete. The war in the Delta is expected to remain at the recent intensified levels and to reflect increasingly ambitious Communist attacks on populated areas.

The following summarizes our near term outlooks, based upon the current Communist force structure in each Military Region; the deployment of the strategic reserve would represent the fruition of the "worst case" scenario presented:

A. Preparations for major activity countrywide. Timing of attacks is generally unclear

B. Major threat areas:

(1) Military Region 1: Hue, Quang Nam and Quang Ngai Provinces

(2) Military Region 2: Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, and Binh Dinh Provinces

(3) Military Region 3: Tay Ninh Province (major attacks may be imminent)

(4) Military Region 4: Moderate phasedown while Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army refit, regroup and prepare for next highpoint.

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VIETNAM PERSPECTIVE

1. A cursory examination of the relative resources available to the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese could easily lead one to conclude that the Communists accomplish a great deal more with considerably fewer resources. This same conclusion could also be applied to the situation in any major U.S. city, i.e., where a small criminal element necessitates large police forces for crime control. Of course, like the crime problem in U.S. cities, the problem in Vietnam is a great deal more complex. Many of the assumptions upon which such conclusions may be based are derived from either misconceptions or from a failure to apply like methodologies in assessing the many variables relating to each side. Additionally, it is easy to overlook a number of peculiarities relevant to the respective sides. The following narrative attempts to place in perspective the many variables involved in the situation in Vietnam and answer the question of whether or not the Communists actually achieve more gains with fewer resources.

2. To begin, it is at best debatable whether the Communists actually have fewer resources when viewed in the context of the total assets supporting, directly or indirectly, the war effort. The following page (Chart I) contains statistics that are indicative of the magnitude of the total Communist military manpower commitment in both North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Obviously, this total commitment is not directed solely toward prosecuting the war in South Vietnam, but a detailed examination of each aspect of this force reveals the extent of the commitment backing North Vietnam's armed forces in the South. A comparison of the respective missions of each type of Communist force, both in the North and the South, reveals striking similarities to those of the South's armed forces. The North has over 300,000 regular combat personnel in North Vietnam, at least 70,000 of whom are potential combatants in the South. Added to this force is a similar commitment of over 300,000 combat personnel in South Vietnam. This total of some 600-700,000 regular combat personnel compares to the South's total of some 780,000 regular combat troops including ARVN, VNAF, VNN and Regional Forces. The North's 1,600,000-man part-time militia force, used basically for general security purposes, has a similar mission to that of the South's 1,000,000-man People's Self Defense Force (PSDF).

3. The most important point is that the magnitude of North Vietnam's overall military commitment is at least equal to that of South Vietnam. Comparing North Vietnam's 304-356,000-

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against major NVA drives are Quang Tri (1972), Hue-Phu Bai Corridor (1974), Quang Nam Province (1974), MR-2 Highland population centers (1972-1974), Ben Cat-Saigon Corridor (1973-1974), and the MR-4 Tri Phap Campaign (1973). NVA/VC forces have consistently used terrorism and attacks on isolated GVN positions (mountain districts, mangrove swamp outposts, Phuoc Long Province, etc.) to perpetuate the aura of ongoing success and the mystic of the inevitability of Communist victory. Western mass media complement this aura by focusing upon each and every Communist initiated incident.

18. The fundamental failure of the Communists has been their inability to win the sympathy of the South's population. No mass defections of people to the Communist side have ever been recorded, a fact most dramatically illustrated by the lack of response to Communist calls for "mass uprisings" during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The people of South Vietnam have consistently "voted with their feet" by fleeing to government controlled areas when their homes have been attacked. The resultant refugee problem for the South, which persists today, is one the Communists have never had to face.

19. But consolidation of areas under their control, an unprecedented growth in their military might and a steady deterioration of the South's defensive assets over the past two years have placed the Communists in their most favorable position in the history of the struggle.

20. Thus, at this stage, it is more a matter of what the South has lost in terms of its ability to defend itself against further more critical military defeats and consequent total defeat than what the North has gained through a long costly effort. The critical question thus becomes what the North stands to accomplish under the above circumstances, not what it has undeniably achieved already.



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CHART I

NVN INTERNAL FORCE STRUCTURE

COMBAT STRENGTH	93-113,000
STRATEGIC RESERVE	70- 70,000
ADMIN/SUPPORT/COMMAND	155-165,000
SUBTOTAL	318-348,000
OTHER FULL TIME FORCES	
ARMED PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES	16,500
REGIONAL FORCES	51,000
NAVY	3,000
AIR FORCE	10,000
	80,500
TOTAL COMBAT FORCES	398-428,500
MILITIA/SELF-DEFENSE FORCES (PART TIME)	1,600,000

NVA/VC STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM

COMBAT	189-214,000
ADMIN/SUPPORT/COMMAND	91-108,000
GUERRILLA	24- 34,000
TOTAL	304-356,000

CURRENT RVNAF STRENGTH*

REGULAR FORCES	494,087
REGIONAL FORCES	288,319
POPULAR FORCES	188,948
TOTAL	971,354

PSDF	990,811
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* DATA AS OF 31 DEC 74. STRENGTHS REPRESENT THOSE PERSONS ASSIGNED (CARRIED ON THE ROLLS) TO UNITS WHETHER PRESENT FOR DUTY OR NOT (E.G., IN SCHOOL, ON LEAVE, AWOL).

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man combat force structure in South Vietnam to the South's 1,000,000-man force (RVNAF, RF And PF, excluding PSDF) results in a distorted perspective of the overall commitment by ignoring most of the North's reserve, rear service and internal defense forces necessary for providing internal security in the North as well as backing up the war effort in the South.

4. The perception of apparent Communist progress is attributable in part to the psychological impact the attacker creates when combat is initiated. The initial tactical advantages accruing to the aggressor will often result in successes that are highly publicized, while later successes by the defender receive less publicity and are either ignored or forgotten, leading the viewer with an inaccurate perception of the eventual outcome. Such was the case in July 1974 when NVA forces mounted a two-division assault southwest of Danang, an operation that justifiably received heavy press coverage. The point that was lost upon all but the closest observers was that Government forces subsequently reversed initial Communist gains (with the exception of continued NVA retention of Thuong Duc District Town), inflicting heavy Communist casualties in the process. Such a course of events is not uncommon, although the above is not intended to deny that the Communists have made some real progress in many important respects.

5. As pointed out earlier, overall Communist manpower assets at least approximate those of the South. The fact remains, however, that Communist assets within South Vietnam are decidedly inferior to those of RVNAF. Communist strategists compensate in large part for this disadvantage by selecting strategic targets upon which their forces can be massed in advance of attacks. Such attacks necessitate a defensive reaction with emphasis on expensive mobile assets to move reinforcements and firepower into position to deter the attacks. RVNAF does not have the assets to defend every important area in depth. Instead, it must disperse its assets over a wide expanse of territory in essentially defensive positions, then react to major threats by pulling defense forces from less critical areas. Under these conditions, RVNAF as a whole is in an essentially defensive/reactive position. It has little in the way of a strategic preemptive option with which to counter or preempt Communist build-ups in critical areas. Only limited tactical offensive operations are practical within budgetary constraints and overall defense requirements.

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6. The South's defense requirements bear most critically upon the question of why the Communists appear to achieve better results with fewer resources. While it is true that the South Vietnamese use more ammunition than the Communists, these expenditures are tied directly to the nature of the conflict. The Communists are able to operate in the security of their rear areas while planning their actions and massing their forces to meet requirements. They can conduct detailed reconnaissance of their targets in advance and bring the necessary firepower and manpower to bear to gain the tactical initiative at the outset. Under such conditions, the only government reserve immediately available in many cases to counter a Communist attack is massive firepower. Moreover, this firepower must be directed in many cases against concealed enemy positions which mandates larger expenditures to effectively counter the threat. The effective use of firepower is a fundamental factor in the enemy to RVNAF loss advantage that RVNAF holds.

7. South Vietnam is faced with the unenviable task of defending a large geographical domain encompassing the homes of approximately 95 per cent of the South's population. Accordingly, its defenses are, of necessity, diluted to provide at least a modicum of security for this vast area. In contrast, the NVA is largely unencumbered by the necessity to spread its forces thin for defensive purposes, due primarily to the South's lack of a viable strategic attack option. The enemy also has to defend his rear areas, but given the current restraints imposed upon the South, the VC/NVA defensive burden consists only of defending against air attack and "raider teams". Neither has caused the commitment of large ground forces on the part of the enemy. Thus, while the Communists can roam virtually at will in their rear areas and plan their initiatives at their own selected pace, the South must tie larger portions of its forces to fixed, static positions. Illustrative of the latter is the necessity for the South's armed forces to defend a minimum of 6,000 bridges on the country's vital (both militarily and economically) lines of communication.

8. The Vietnamese Navy likewise must employ a large "brown water" fleet to provide security for thousands of miles of inland waterways in the Delta as well as a "blue water" fleet to prevent seaborne Communist infiltration activity along the South's 1,500-mile coastline.

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9. The Vietnamese Air Force constitutes one of the more expensive components of the military budget. This force is critical to help blunt Communist initiatives through the use of tactical bombing support of ground troops under attack. Perhaps even more critical is the added mobility afforded by air assets in moving reinforcements to battle zones to assist in staving off massed Communist forces. Thus, requirements for defense are inherently far greater than those for offense under any circumstances.

10. Comparison of military aid levels received by North and South Vietnam also can be misleading. Preliminary analysis reveals that Hanoi received at least \$260 million (Chart II) in military aid deliveries in 1974, or 37 per cent of the \$700 million (Chart III) U.S. aid allocation for South Vietnam during Fiscal Year 1975. There are numerous qualifiers to this figure, however, that must be considered in evaluating relative aid levels. First, the estimates regarding Communist aid are simply that -- estimates -- which are based on admittedly fragmentary data which have become increasingly so following the drawdowns in intelligence collection over the past two years. This contrasts with the aid package for South Vietnam, every dollar of which is a matter of public record.

11. Secondly, the \$260 million figure, which assuredly will increase as further data become available, is based on the comparable cost of equipment made in the U.S. There is no way of determining either the actual dollar value or detailing any accounting of material provided to North Vietnam or the subsequent transshipment of material to South Vietnam.

12. Additionally, military aid in the form of training, spare parts, cost of transportation, subsistence, POL for the military, advisors, facilities, construction and maintenance and equipment maintenance are unknown and are not included in the estimate. Thus, packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) costs, which consume 15-25 per cent of U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam, are not included in estimates of aid to North Vietnam.

13. A significant factor in aid deliveries to North Vietnam in 1974 was the increased levels of ammunition, a major factor in increasing NVA stockpiles in South Vietnam to an estimated 66,000 short tons in excess of expenditures. These stocks are considered adequate to sustain a military campaign at 1972 offensive levels for approximately one year in MR's 1 and 2 and longer in MR's 3 and 4.

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
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CHART II

MILITARY AID TO NVN IN 1974*
(Millions of Dollars)

	<u>PRC</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Air Defense	31	1
Field Artillery	4	4
Armor	6	3
Small Arms	17	6
Ammunition	105	50
Trucks	5	3
Helicopters	0	13
Prime Movers	0	3
Totals	168	83

*Preliminary DIA estimates as of 30 November 1974.
Numbers rounded off to nearest \$5 million. Additional
\$5 million in military aid deliveries received from
Eastern European countries.



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CHART III

DAV BUDGET ALLOCATIONS
(Millions of Dollars)

FUNDING SET ASIDE

PCH&T	74.0
DAO Administration	36.2
Training	6.5
F-5 Payback	<u>3.3</u>
Total	120.0

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Army	409.0
Air Force	159.0
Navy	<u>12.0</u>
Total	580.0
Grand Total	700.0

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14. Thus, while total military aid deliveries to North Vietnam cannot be readily compared to South Vietnam's aid receipts, it can be stated with confidence that those deliveries have been more than sufficient to support the war in the South. Furthermore, it bears reemphasizing that the materiel flowing into South Vietnam is designed for use in offensive operations while significant portions of the aid package to South Vietnam are consumed by such peripheral costs as transportation. Further, significant portions of the actual materiel received goes toward meeting purely defensive requirements.

15. The basic question involved in determining which side makes more efficient use of its resources can be addressed, with some further elaboration, by the question, "What is each side attempting to attain?" The South is attempting to defend its territorial and political integrity and its armed forces are oriented in that direction. It is, indeed, constrained from adopting a more active course. That defense requires a broad dispersal of resources which prohibits adequate coverage of all areas, thereby allowing attacking enemy forces to concentrate their assets in selected vulnerable areas. This, in turn, increases defensive burdens by necessitating use of expensive assets to reinforce beleaguered forces and repel attacks. The only other recourse is to abandon defense of the Communist objective; however, that decision represents acceptance of a further loss of government integrity, the guiding principle of its defense policy.

16. The South has been reasonably successful in preserving its integrity, but at a high cost in lives and vital resources. Further, these losses, more than any strategic battlefield defeats to date, have placed the government in real danger of eventually losing control of vital areas such as Hue and Tay Ninh that are critical to its continued viability.

17. North Vietnam has as its primary objective the reunification of the two Vietnams under Communist control. In terms of that overall objective, the Communists, to date, have made their most important gains in sparsely populated mountainous areas that are of secondary significance in relation to the heavily populated lowlands. Communist battlefield successes have been remarkably limited when one considers the tremendous expenditures of North Vietnamese manpower and resources. Of particular significance is the fact that NVA attacks have been stopped or blunted whenever they have been launched into areas considered important by the Government, especially in lowland rice-growing zones. Recent examples of ARVN successes

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~~FACT SHEET~~

AOSOP

24 February 1975

SUBJECT: NVA Strategic Reserve



PURPOSE: To provide information on the reconstitution and organization of NVA strategic reserve divisions

FACTS:

1. (S) Since the January 1973 ceasefire, NVN has reconstituted its strategic reserve forces and created a corps headquarters in NVN to improve its command and control over selected reserve units.
2. (S) In January 1973, components of only two NVA infantry divisions -- the 308th and 308B -- were located in NVN. During the remainder of 1973, Hanoi added five additional infantry divisions to its reserve forces. This was accomplished through the return to NVN from Quang Tri Province of two infantry divisions (the 312th and 320B), the return to NVN from northern Laos of the 316th Division, the creation of a new division (the 341st) in extreme southern NVN, and the conversion of the 338th Division from a training to a combat unit.
3. (S) Hanoi's strategic reserve now consists of seven divisions:

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
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DIVISION	EST STRENGTH*	LOCATION	DEPLOYMENT TIME (DAYS)		
			MR-1	MR-2	MR-3
308	10,000	Near Hanoi	10	16	27
308B	10,000	Near Hanoi	10	16	27
312	10,000	Central NVN	9	15	26
316	10,000	Upper Pan-handle	9	15	26
320B	10,000	Central NVN	9	15	26
338	10,000	Central NVN	9	15	26
341	10,000	Extreme south-ern NVN	2	--	--

*NVA divisions normally leave behind a garrison cadre when they deploy from the north. The estimated deployment strength of an NVA division is 8,500.

4. (S) In late 1973, Hanoi formed a corps headquarters in central NVN to provide better command and control over its strategic reserve divisions and effectively integrate infantry, artillery, armor, air defense and engineer assets. The corps headquarters has operational control over four strategic reserve divisions (308th, 312th, 320B and 338th) as well as armor, artillery, air defense and engineer assets, which it can orchestrate to satisfy specific battlefield requirements.

5. (S) The reserve combat forces which Hanoi maintains in NVN provide it with the wherewithal to heavily reinforce the southern battlefield, thereby tipping the military balance in the Communists' favor.

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AOSOP

27 February 1975

SUBJECT: Infiltration

PURPOSE: To provide information on above subject.

FACTS:

1. (S) During the first two months of 1975, the NVA infiltrated at least one combat replacement group per day. Total 1975 infiltration arrival estimate is as follows:

TOTAL 1975 INFILTRATION ARRIVALS

<u>AREA</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
2nd Corps	-
MRTT	3,200
MR-5	2,600
B-3 Front	8,200
COSVN	29,900
Total	43,900

2. (S) The NVA began its 1974-1975 dry season infiltration season in mid-November 1974 and had dispatched six COSVN bound groups by the end of November. Total 1974-1975 dry season infiltration is as follows:

TOTAL 1974-75 DRY SEASON INFILTRATION ARRIVALS
(Includes all 1975 Arrivals Plus Dec 74 Arrivals)

<u>AREA</u>	<u>DEC 74</u>	<u>PERSONNEL 1975</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2ND CORPS	-	-	-
MRTT	-	3,200	3,200
MR-5	-	2,600	2,600
B-3 FRONT	2,600	8,200	10,800
COSVN	1,100	29,900	31,000
TOTAL	3,700	43,900	47,600

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3. (S) Total 1974-1975 dry season infiltration arrivals by month, by area is as follows:

AREA	DEC 74	JAN 75	FEB 75	MAR 75	TOTAL
2ND CORPS	-	-	-	-	-
MRTT	-	3,100	-	100	3,200
MR-5	-	-	1,600	1,000	2,600
B-3 FRONT	2,600	1,000	5,100	2,000	10,800
COSVN	1,100	4,100	18,600	7,200	31,000
TOTAL	3,700	8,200	25,300	10,300	47,600

4. (S) There are preliminary indications that the NVA have or are about to dispatch 14 additional groups (7,700 personnel) to the B-3 Front. Should they be confirmed, the B-3 Front's dry season arrival estimate would be increased to 18,500, and the overall dry season estimate to 55,300.

5. (S) The NVA's rate of infiltration during the current dry season is much greater than that for the same period during the 1973-1974 dry season.

AREA	(DEC, JAN, FEB, MAR ARRIVALS) 1973-74	1974-75
2ND CORPS	-	-
MRTT	200	3,200
MR-5	3,800	2,600
B-3 FRONT	8,900	10,800
COSVN	21,500	31,000
TOTAL	34,400	47,600

6. (S) It must be noted that the above figures include arrivals for the entire month of March 1974 while at least 10,000 more will probably be added to the 1975 estimate.


7. (S) In addition to personnel infiltrating to various areas of RVN, since mid-November 1974, the NVA has also deployed four 5XXX series groups (2,000 men) to MR-559 and at least eleven 9XXX series groups to yet unknown destinations, but probably to S. Laos and/or the 968th NVA Infantry Division.

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NVA PERSONNEL INFILTRATION TO SOUTH VIETNAM

1966	91,600
1967	95,600
1968	235,200
1969	106,200
1970	53,600
1971	65,700
1972	151,800
1973	75,100
1974	93,600
1975 (to date)	43,900



Total since January 1973 Ceasefire: 199,500

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
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 89-7, #5 DIA Mr. 12/26/89

By KBH NARA Date 2/6/90

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LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES

1. Since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the North Vietnamese have made sweeping changes in their logistics system and are now in a stronger position to support their forces operating in South Vietnam than at any time during the war.
2. During the past two years, the NVA upgraded its rail, road and coastal shipping facilities. The total tonnage of material moved to storage areas in the NVN Panhandle increased 13 per cent between 1973 and the end of November 1974 (from 457,000 to 517,900 short tons).
3. Extensive improvements at the port of Dong Ha permitted the Communists to increase their shipments into South Vietnam by 64 per cent during the first eleven months of 1974 as compared with all of 1973. (figures are in short tons).

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1973</u>
Overland	110,000	99,800
Coastal	137,500	49,500
Total	247,500	149,300

Taking full advantage of its newly built logistics facilities, the NVA has been able to stockpile over 66,000 tons of ammunition inside South Vietnam. This amount alone is enough for at least a full year of intense combat. Additional ammunition could be quickly obtained from extensive stocks in the NVN panhandle.

4. To help move the supplies, the Communists have undertaken major road building and upgrading projects involving more than 1,000 miles of roads in Laos and South Vietnam. By the end of November 1973, NVA engineers had all but completed a new dual-land highway through South Laos. Nearly all supplies and infiltration personnel follow this route on the way to the B-3 Front (Central Highlands) and COSVN.

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MR 89-7, #6 DIA Rr 12/26/89

By KBH NARA, Date 2/6/90


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(MR-3 and MR-4). Providing fuel for truck convoys ranging over hundreds of miles has always been a major problem for the NVA. By the end of December 1974, however, the NVA completed its POL pipeline which now stretches from the Chinese border with NVN to Loc Ninh, just 75 miles north of Saigon.

5. In summary, the Communists have improved their logistics system to the point that logistics no longer represent a major constraint upon their military options.



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
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NVA STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM CEASEFIRE AND CURRENT*

	<u>Jan 1973</u>	<u>Feb 1975</u>	<u>Net Change</u>
Combat Personnel	130-156,000	189-214,000	Plus 58,000
Admin Personnel	64-78,000	91-108,000	Plus 29,000
Total Personnel	194-234,000	280-322,000	Plus 87,000
Divisions	16 (+1 AD)	17 (+3 AD)	Plus 1 (+2 AD)
Regiments	79 (+12 AD)	94 (+26 AD)	Plus 15 (+14 AD)
Armor Vehicles	90-115	665-750	Plus 610
Artillery Pieces	85-105	350-490	Plus 325

*Guerrilla totals of 24-34,000 not included.



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MR 89-7, # 7 DIA Ltr. 12/26/89


By KDH NARA, Date 2/6/90

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HES RATING POPULATION TRENDS



HES PERCENTAGES

AB=
72.0

C = 15.3

DEVN=
12.7

DEC

— PERCENT AB POPULATION
..... PERCENT C POPULATION
- - - PERCENT DEVN POPULATION

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.

MR 93-52, #17, 2012 DEC 4/15/93

By USP NARA, Date 6/6/93


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1

HES RATING POPULATION TRENDS



HES PERCENTAGES

AB=
63.7

C= 20.1

DEVN=
16.2


DEC

— PERCENT AB POPULATION
- - - PERCENT C POPULATION
... PERCENT DEVN POPULATION

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2 HES RATING POPULATION TRENDS




HES PERCENTAGES

AB = 81.5
C = 10.6
DEVN = 7.9


DEC

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3 HES RATING POPULATION TRENDS



HES PERCENTAGES




DEC

— PERCENT AB POPULATION
..... PERCENT C POPULATION
--- PERCENT DEVN POPULATION


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4 HES RATING POPULATION TRENDS




HES PERCENTAGES



— PERCENT AB POPULATION
..... PERCENT C POPULATION

~~SECRET~~



FACT SHEET

AOSOP-IX

Mr. Kinder/3177
14 January 1975

SUBJECT: GVN Losses in Combat During 1974/Early 1975

PURPOSE: To assess the impact of Communist military activity in South Vietnam

FACTS: 1. (S) Major GVN losses resulting from combat in 1974 and early 1975 are as follows:

a. In Phu Loc District of Thua Thien Province, approximately 15-20 kilometers Southeast of Hue, NVA forces secured most of the dominant highground overlooking vital Route 1. RVNAF counterattacks succeeded in reasserting control of Mo Tau Mountain, from which NVA artillery fire had forced the closure of Phu Bai Airbase; on 11 December. However, the NVA retains control of the remaining contested highground from which later attacks into the lowlands are anticipated.

b. Central Quang Nam Province. NVA forces mounted a two-division operation on 18 July that extended throughout the summer. In the heaviest fighting at that time since the cease-fire agreement, the NVA overran southwestern Duc Duc District and captured Thuong Duc District town. Following the major phase of the offensive in August, fighting then centered on Hill 1062, approximately 5 kilometers northeast of Thuong Duc, the major terrain feature commanding the approach to the lowlands southeast of Danang. Control of the hill changed hands several times between August and early November when airborne forces gained solid control. In mid-December, however, RVNAF voluntarily abandoned Hill 1062, pulling back to a defensive

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MR 89-739 DIA-Br 12/26/89

By 1636 NARA Date 2/6/00

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CURRENT RVNAF AND COMMUNIST COMBAT TROOP STRENGTH

	<u>VC/NVA*</u>	<u>RVNAF**</u>	
MR-1	122-138,000	Regular Forces	90,930
		Regional Forces	38,225
		Popular Forces	29,004
		Total	158,159
MR-2	60-75,000	Regular Forces	76,165
		Regional Forces	62,886
		Popular Forces	42,143
		Total	181,194
MR-3	74-85,000	Regular Forces	256,466
		Regional Forces	104,579
		Popular Forces	48,511
		Total	409,556
MR-4	48-58,000	Regular Forces	70,526
		Regional Forces	82,629
		Popular Forces	69,290
		Total	222,445
Totals	304-356,000		971,354

*Includes combat troops, administrative service troops and guerrilla forces.

**Data as of 31 December 1974.

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MR 39-7-78 DIA 12/26/89

By K3H NARA Date 2/3/90

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f. Tanh Linh District town in Binh Tuy Province. The fall of Tanh Linh in late December enables Communist forces to threaten nearby Hoai Duc. Complete Communist success in this area would provide them control of an important rice-growing area and greatly facilitate logistics and infiltration efforts into southeastern MR-3.

g. Nui Ba Den in Tay Ninh Province. The loss of the peak of this mountain denies the GVN use of a key observation post to monitor Communist troop movements and artillery fire, thus robbing it of an important early warning advantage. Communist troops have always occupied lower positions on the mountain which afforded them similar advantages. Thus, their gain lies essentially in what the GVN has lost.


h. In the Mekong Delta, Communist forces sustained a year-long campaign featuring monthly "highpoints", the cumulative effect of which was to produce a serious decline in security in many outlying areas. Their efforts culminated in a sustained highpoint in December which exceeded in intensity and scope any previous efforts over the past several years. This effort may have produced some positive long-range benefits for the GVN, however, by awakening the GVN and RVNAF planners to the necessity for strong corrective measures. However, the Communist threat remains as strong, and possibly stronger, than in the past and a GVN reversal of current trends will require a slow, painstaking effort.

2. (S) Communist progress over the past year cannot be measured solely in terms of military victories. They have capitalized on the absence of U.S. air interdiction since the ceasefire agreement to expand and upgrade their logistics and infiltration corridors into South Vietnam and branch routes into forward areas. They have vastly improved command and control of their forces by reorganizing units into consolidated, well-equipped conventional forces that are now poised, in many cases, near highly sensitive GVN-controlled areas. Finally, recent battlefield victories have generated a disturbing Communist momentum that contrasts sharply with the essentially defensive posture of South Vietnam's armed forces which are faced with the necessity of implementing major austerity programs. A reading of all available indicators suggests that the situation will worsen before (and if) it improves.

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position two kilometers to the east. The move was dictated by the MR-1 commanders need to reconstitute a viable reserve force in the region as well as a fear that the Airborne's northern and southern flanks were dangerously exposed. The overall impact of the fighting was a slightly improved tactical position for NVA forces and near total disruption of the GVN's pacification efforts in the province.

c. Quang Ngai Province. A sustained campaign by Communist local forces through the last six months of 1974 resulted in a serious erosion of GVN security throughout the coastal lowlands. The most serious decline was in the north-eastern portion of the province. Subsequent RVNAF efforts to restore a measure of security there have proved singularly unsuccessful in the face of well entrenched Communist forces. Additionally, the NVA 52nd Brigade overran the semi-isolated district town of Minh Long in mid August and threatened neighboring Nghia Hanh to the north. While Communist gains were not spectacular, they were quite real, and the general security situation in the province is the most serious in some time.

d. In MR-2, there was sporadic heavy activity throughout 1974, but the GVN suffered no serious setbacks. Communist forces systematically eliminated the remaining four isolated GVN positions in the highlands, but these had no significant military value. By the end of 1974, RVNAF had the initiative in the major threat areas, but recent developments indicate the deployment of the NVA 968th Division to the highlands, suggesting that major fighting will soon materialize there.

e. Phuoc Long Province in MR-3. Intense combined arms NVA attacks beginning in mid December resulted in the fall of the entire province by 6 January 1975. Phuoc Long is the first province to fall under complete Communist control since the ceasefire and breaches a psychological threshold prevalent since that time that attacks on province capitals represent a major escalation of activity. The province is of relatively minor significance, but Communist control does help solidify their rear areas, a basic objective of the current dry season campaign.

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- a. (S) Divisions

- (1) 77th AA Div - 1,000 men; formed in August 1973 in Loc Ninh Area.
- (2) 377th AD Div - 1,000 men; entered Khe Sanh area from NVN around ceasefire; deployed to Takepone, Laos April 1973; returned to Cam Lo area, Quang Tri Prov by Dec 1974.
- (3) 673rd AD Div - 1,000 men; formed in Khe Sanh area April 1973.
- (4) 968th Inf Div (3 Regts) - 5,000 men; deployed to MR-2 in Jan 1974 from Saravane area, Laos.

- b. Air Defense Regiments (SS) [Much text just like this on pp. 2-4.
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E.O. 12956, Sec. 1.3 (a) (1) and (4)

MR 93-52, FILED 17, 4/15/93

By: KBF, NARA Date: 2/10/94

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13526
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON 31 DECEMBER N/A

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~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~



Increase in Air Defense since the Ceasefire

1. One of the most imposing aspects of the Communist military build-up since the Ceasefire Agreement has been in the field of air defense.

..... Two operational sites in the Khe Sanh area and two more north of Cam Lo now provide SA-2 coverage over all of Quang Tri Province. Additionally, there has been a net gain of 14 NVA AAA Regiments deployed in SVN since the Ceasefire. Fourteen regiments now protect the vital Route 9 and Route 14 logistics complex in northern MR-1, while the remainder are deployed along logistics routes and in Communist base areas as far south as northern MR-3. Total NVA air defense assets in SVN, based on TOE, are:

	MR-1	MR-2	MR-3	MR-4	Total
Divisions	2	0	1	0	3
Regiments	19	4	3	0	26
Guns	1,360	240	200	0	1,800
Personnel	23,400	3,600	6,500	0	33,500

Includes

Guns range in size from 12.7MM to 100MM.

2. A significant aspect of the NVA's air defense build-up has been the introduction of sophisticated radar control facilities which enhance both the accuracy of their guns and acquisition range of their AA system. Finally, the highly versatile SA-7 missile has taken an increasingly greater toll of RVNAF aircraft in recent months. The versatility of this weapon poses a potential threat to aircraft operating in any area of the south. The major impact of

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DIA Mr. 4/15/93, MR 93-52, #16


By KSH, NARA, Date 2/10/94

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the system has been the denial of extensive air space to RVNAF tactical ground support, bombing, photo reconnaissance and resupply/evacuation operations. It has also permitted the NVA to develop its rear service system unhindered by strategic air interdiction.



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
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AAA/SA-7
THREAT


Jan 1974

Jan 1975


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


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
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RVNAF CASUALTIES CY 1974 KILLED BY HOSTILE ACTION

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
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
RVNAF CASUALTIES CY 1973

WOUNDED BY HOSTILE ACTION

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
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
RVNAF CASUALTIES CY 1973

KILLED BY HOSTILE ACTION

COMPILED 19 FEB 75




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RVNAF KHA BY YEAR SINCE 1966

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
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WASH DC; AMEMB PARIS; CIA, WASH, D.C.
FROM : AMERICAN EMBASSY SAIGON

DATE: February 8, 1975

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAG: PINS VS
SUBJECT: HES RESULTS - DECEMBER 1974 (U)

REF :

1. (C) DECEMBER 1974 RESULTS

A. The total estimated population of the Republic of Vietnam increased by 7,622 people from 20,335,907 to 20,343,529.

B. AB population percent was 72.0, a decrease of 4.5 percent from November 1974. AB population was 14,642,006 people, a decrease of 918,520 people from November 1974.

C. C population percent was 15.3, an increase of 0.2 percent from November 1974. C population was 3,109,410 people, an increase of 49,033 people from November 1974.

D. ABC population percent was 87.3, a decrease of 4.3 percent from November 1974. ABC population was 17,751,416 people, a decrease of 869,487 people from November 1974.

E. D population percent was 5.5, an increase of 1.1 percent from November 1974. D population was 1,118,354 people, an increase of 240,903 people from November 1974.

F. E population percent was 2.5, an increase of 0.3 percent from November 1974. E population was 504,427 people, an increase of 72,974 from November 1974.

G. DE population percent was 8.0, an increase of 1.4 percent from November 1974. DE population was 1,622,781 people, an increase of 313,877 people from November 1974.

SAB, 4/3/84

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D-70 DS-323

Drafted by: SAAFO/SRA:HLBraddock

Drafting Date: 2/7/75

Phone No.: 3915

Contents and Classification: SAAFO:G.D.Jacobson

Clearances:

AMB
DCM 2
EX
POL 10
ECON
AID/DIR
USAID/5
USIS/DIR 2
OSA 3 (SNEPP)
DAO/OPD 5
DAO/ELT 2
DANANG 2
NHA TRANG 4
BIEN HOA 2
CAN THO 2
SAAFO/J
SAAFO/SRA 3
POUCH 5
CHRON
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H. V rated population percent was 4.5, an increase of 2.7 percent from November 1974. V rated population was 917,675 people, an increase of 567,073 people from November 1974.

I. N rated population percent remained constant at 0.3. N rated population was 51,657 people, a decrease of 3,841 people from November 1974.

J. DENV population percent was 12.7, an increase of 4.3 percent from November 1974, DENV population was 2,592,113 people, an increase of 877,109 people from November 1974.

K. Distribution of V hamlets/population and the change from November 1974.

MR	V HAMLETS	CHANGE	V POPULATION	CHANGE
1	382	Minus 7	81,535	Minus 1,578
2	313	Plus 2	105,791	Plus 1,875
3	147	Plus 81	67,274	Plus 53,505
4	564	Plus 451	663,075	Plus 513,271
RVN	1,406	Plus 527	917,675	Plus 567,073

2. (C) ANALYSIS

The December AB decline of 4.5% percent to 72 percent was the largest monthly regression since the North Vietnamese invasion in 1972 (in April 1972 AB percentage fell 10 points to 71%). While AB population increased slightly in MR-1 and MR-2, it declined substantially in MR-3 (down 5.5%) and MR-4 (down 8.9%) where enemy offensive actions were concentrated during the month. Hardest hit in MR-3 were the provinces of Phuoc Long and Binh Tuy where the number of V-rated hamlets increased to 66 and 15 respectively. The GVN sustained losses in most provinces in MR-4 and half the Delta provinces registered AB declines of 10 percent or more. MR-4's 9 percent decline in AB was one of the largest decreases on record and it brought that region to the lowest point (60% AB) in the past five years. Of MR-4's 16 provinces, 9 reported 10 percent or more of total hamlets as communist controlled (V-rated). These included Vinh Binh (112 V hamlets), Vinh Long (99), Kien Giang (87), An Xuyen (69), Chuong Thien (46), Bac Lieu (43), Ba Xuyen (42), Phong Dinh (25), and Kien Luong (15). Over a third of the countrywide V-hamlet total (1,406) appeared in MR-4 (564) in the December HES report. This number of V hamlets, the largest in MR-4 since the middle of 1969, reflects the concerted communist attacks against villages and hamlets throughout the Delta in December. COMMENT: It is important to note that some of the apparent regression in December actually reflects more accurate reporting of situations which developed prior to December. At the Prime Minister's direction the original HES reports which were considered inaccurate were returned to the file (resulting in a two week delay), and subsequent reports incorporated some regression not previously reported. Thus, while the bulk of the changes in the December HES reflect the impact of December events, more accurate reporting of pre-existing conditions is also reflected.

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3. (C) The numbers and percentages of hamlets and population in RVN in each HES rating category for December 1974 are presented below. (Changes from last month are in parentheses)

RATING	HAMLETS	PERCENT OF HAMLETS	POPULATION	PERCENT OF POP
A	2,425	20.2 (Minus 1.4)	7,554,166	37.1 (Minus 1.9)
B	4,640	38.6 (Minus 3.7)	7,087,840	34.8 (Minus 2.5)
(AB)	7,065	58.8 (Minus 5.1)	14,642,006	72.0 (Minus 4.5)
C	2,321	19.3 (Minus 0.3)	3,109,410	15.3 (Plus 0.2)
(ABC)	9,386	78.1 (Minus 5.5)	17,751,416	87.3 (Minus 4.3)
D	808	6.7 (Plus 0.9)	1,118,354	5.5 (Plus 1.1)
E	242	2.0 (Plus 0.2)	504,427	2.5 (Plus 0.3)
(DE)	1,050	8.7 (Plus 1.1)	1,622,781	8.0 (Plus 1.4)
N	179	1.5 (N.C.)	51,657	0.3 (N.C.)
V	1,406	11.7 (Plus 4.3)	917,675	4.5 (Plus 2.7)
DEVN	2,635	21.9 (Plus 5.5)	2,592,113	12.7 (Plus 4.3)
Total	12,021	100.0	20,343,529	100.0

4. Percentages of population in each military region in each HES rating category for December 1974 are presented below. (Changes from last month are in parentheses).

	MR-1	MR-2	MR-3	MR-4
Total Population:	3,383,375	3,601,654	6,145,821	7,212,67
RATING				
A	19.8 (-1.1)	36.8 (+2.3)	60.0 (-2.7)	26.0 (-4.0)
B	43.9 (+2.3)	44.8 (-1.9)	24.4 (-2.8)	34.6 (-4.8)
AB	63.7 (+1.1)	81.5 (+0.3)	84.3 (-5.5)	60.6 (-8.9)
C	20.1 (-0.8)	10.6 (+0.6)	11.5 (+2.7)	18.6 (-1.5)
DEV	15.7 (-0.2)	7.0 (-0.8)	4.1 (+2.7)	20.9 (+10.0)
D	6.0 (-0.4)	2.7 (-1.2)	2.7 (+1.7)	9.0 (+2.7)
E	7.2 (+0.1)	1.3 (+0.3)	0.3 (+0.1)	2.6 (+0.6)
V	2.4 (0.0)	2.9 (0.0)	1.1 (+0.8)	9.2 (+7.1)
N	0.5 (0.0)	0.9 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)

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5. Percentages of hamlets in each military region in each HES rating category for December 1974 are presented below. (Changes from last month are in parentheses)

	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>	<u>MR-4</u>
Total Hamlets:	2,226	3,260	2,194	4,341
<u>RATING</u>				
A	6.8 (-0.6)	21.2 (+1.2)	34.3 (-3.7)	19.1 (-2.6)
B	43.5 (+2.1)	48.6 (-0.9)	34.0 (-7.7)	30.9 (-6.9)
AB	50.3 (+1.5)	69.8 (+0.3)	68.3 (-11.4)	50.0 (-9.5)
C	24.0 (-0.9)	11.8 (+0.6)	21.5 (+5.4)	21.4 (-3.6)
DEV	24.8 (-0.5)	13.7 (-0.6)	10.1 (+6.0)	28.4 (+13.2)
D	6.4 (-0.1)	2.8 (-1.0)	3.1 (+2.1)	11.6 (+2.3)
E	1.3 (0.0)	1.3 (+0.2)	0.3 (+0.1)	3.8 (+0.4)
V	17.2 (-0.3)	9.6 (0.0)	6.7 (+3.6)	13.0 (+10.3)
N	0.9 (0.0)	4.6 (-0.3)	0.0 (0.0)	0.2 (0.0)

6. (C) Provinces are ranked according to percent AB population. Rank from last month is in parentheses after the province name; percentage change from last month is in parentheses after the current figure. Autonomous city scores (along with combined city/province scores) are presented below the province in which they are located.

<u>PROVINCE/AUTONOMOUS CITY</u>	<u>RANK LAST MONTH</u>	<u>% AB</u>
1. Sa Dec	(5)	100.0 (N.C.)
2. Ninh Thuan	(3)	100.0 (N.C.)
3. Tuyen Duc	(4)	100.0 (N.C.)
Dalat City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		100.0 (N.C.)
4. Quang Duc	(6)	99.5 (N.C.)
5. Go Cong	(1)	99.0 (Minus 0.9)
6. An Giang	(2)	98.0 (Minus 1.9)
7. Gia Dinh	(8)	97.6 (Minus 0.4)
Saigon		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		98.9 (Minus 0.1)
8. Phu Bon	(11)	96.5 (Plus 0.6)
9. Lam Dong	(13)	95.5 (Minus 0.1)
10. Khanh Hoa	(12)	95.2 (Minus 0.6)
Nha Trang City		100.0 (N.C.)
Cam Ranh City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		98.0 (Minus 0.2)

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PROVINCE/AUTONOMOUS CITY	RANK LAST MONTH	% AB
11. Chau Doc	(9)	93.1 (Minus 3.6)
12. Binh Thuan	(16)	88.4 (Minus 2.2)
13. Darlac	(15)	88.2 (Minus 3.6)
14. Bien Hoa	(14)	87.8 (Minus 5.9)
15. Pleiku	(18)	83.4 (N.C.)
16. Binh Duong	(20)	78.4 (Plus 1.9)
17. Phuoc Tuy	(19)	76.5 (N.C.)
Vung Tau City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		86.0 (N.C.)
18. Thua Thien	(21)	75.3 (Plus 0.3)
Hue City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		81.8 (Plus 0.2)
19. Long An	(17)	70.7 (Minus 15.8)
20. Quang Tin	(26)	66.1 (Minus 0.9)
21. Quang Tri	(30)	64.9 (Plus 1.4)
22. Kontum	(29)	64.4 (N.C.)
23. Phu Yen	(33)	61.8 (Plus 3.6)
24. Kien Hoa	(22)	61.6 (Minus 10.2)
25. Kien Phong	(31)	60.0 (Minus 2.1)
26. Ba Xuyen	(27)	59.0 (Minus 7.5)
27. Binh Tuy	(7)	58.9 (Minus 40.5)
28. Phong Dinh	(32)	56.2 (Minus 2.2)
Can Tho City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		70.3 (Minus 1.4)
29. Binh Dinh	(36)	53.4 (Plus 2.2)
Qui Nhon City		98.9 (N.C.)
COMBINED		63.3 (Plus 1.7)
30. Tay Ninh	(28)	51.0 (Minus 14.9)
31. Quang Nam	(37)	50.7 (Plus 2.8)
Da Nang City		99.8 (Minus 0.1)
COMBINED		72.9 (Plus 1.6)
32. Long Khanh	(25)	48.5 (Minus 19.7)
33. Vinh Long	(23)	47.9 (Minus 22.0)
34. Dinh Tuong	(38)	45.1 (Minus 0.1)
My Tho City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		54.4 (N.C.)
35. An Xuyen	(34)	45.1 (Minus 12.0)
36. Kien Tuong	(24)	34.2 (Minus 34.1)
37. Quang Ngai	(42)	33.3 (Plus 2.6)
38. Hau Nghia	(41)	33.0 (Minus 8.2)
39. Bac Lieu	(35)	30.6 (Minus 23.0)
40. Vinh Binh	(39)	24.6 (Minus 19.1)
41. Kien Giang	(40)	19.9 (Minus 21.9)
Rach Gia City		100.0 (N.C.)
COMBINED		33.7 (Minus 17.7)

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<u>PROVINCE/AUTONOMOUS CITY</u>	<u>RANK LAST</u> <u>MONTH</u>	<u>% AB</u>
42. Chuong Thien	(43)	14.3 (Minus 12.1)
43. Phuoc Long	(10)	0.0 (Minus 96.2)
44. Binh Long	(44)	0.0 (N.C.)

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